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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-DISCOVERY PRACTICE
IN NEBRASKA
Determining the guilt or innocence of the accused is one of
the ultimate purposes of any criminal proceeding. To accomplish
this purpose it is necessary to attempt a reconstruction of what
occurred in the past. Hence, the function of a trial is to bring
to light all of the facts which are relevant to the alleged crime or
defenses which are the subject of the trial. Formerly the "sport-
ing" theory' of justice was widespread, and under it the fact-
finding processes of the courts took on some of the aspects of
an athletic contest. These were truly adversary proceedings,
sometimes to such an extent that the emphasis seemed to bear
more upon the tactical skill and finesse of the respective advo-
cates than upon the real purpose of a trial, namely, a correct
and complete revelation of all pertinent facts. The adoption in
1946 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is the most
notable attempt in recent years to modify the "sporting" theory."
One of the most important innovations wrought by the adoption
of these rules is the development of various discovery devices
through which various elements of opposing counsel's case may
be brought to light. Of course, state as well as federal courts
are gradually reforming their judicial processes 3, and improve-
ments in the processes of state courts often embody many of the
same principles found in the federal rules. As these devices
developed the civil courts accepted and used them long before
the criminal courts; even today in most jurisdictions discovery
practice in criminal proceedings is far more limited than in civil
actions.4
The term discovery practice as used in this note includes
primarily all of the devices which are available for securing a
pre-trial disclosure of the elements of opposing counsel's case;
in addition, there will be references to various devices which pro-
vide for disclosure at the trial of certain evidence that might
othe wise never have come to light.
RATIONALES AND LIMITATIONS
The innovations which have led to more liberal discovery
I Coinage of this phrase is usually attributed to Justice Holmes.
2 They followed the substantial success of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure which were adopted in 1938.
3 Orfield, Criminal Procedure from Arrest to Appeal 323 et seq. (1947).
4 Compare Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rules 15-17 and Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 26-37.
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and inspection prior to trial have been subject to certain criticisms.
First, it has been suggested that there is no precedent at com-
mon law which provides a basis for the rights of discovery. This
objection has always been used to oppose reform in any field;
hence, it is not very persuasive. Nor is it entirely correct since
there actually is some supporting case-authority, in addition to
the traditional supervisory control that courts exercise over pub-
lic officers.5 Second, it has been argued that to allow discovery
of various elements of proof before trial will induce false testi-
mony. As Wigmore points out this contention has previously
been discredited in analogous fields.6  The knowledge obtained
by the defendant will not seriously reduce the probative force
of the evidence if the theory of the prosecution is correct. 7 Third,
it is said on the one hand that the prosecution is placed at a
great disadvantage while others argue just as strenuously that
liberal discovery places the defendant at a serious and unfair
disadvantage.s An adequate exposition of the weakness inherent
in these arguments will not be attempted at this time but suffice
it to say that they are far from conclusive.9
The most powerful affirmative argument for discovery is
that the element of surprise and the practice of concealment are
to a large extent eliminated from the trial. Both attorneys are
provided with a more complete picture of the evidence which
will be presented upon trial; thus they will be able to do a better
job of representing their client and reveal the case in its fullest
and most understandable form. Secondarily, discovery proced-
ures, supplemented by depositions, serve to preserve testimony
of witnesses and allow the court to hear the various versions of
what happened as they were told when fresh in the mind of the
witness. Theoretically at least this will provide more accurate
statements of the facts as they existed.10
5 Orfield, Criminal Procedure from Arrest to Appeal 329 (1947).
OVI Wigmore, Evidence §§ 1859. 1863 (3d ed. 1940).
7 Orfield, op. cit. supra note 5, at 330.
8 Comment, 60 Yale L.J. 626, 634 (1951).
9 Ibid. This article lays out the complete counter arguments for these
two propositions. Prosecution at a Disadvantage. This is offset by the
handicaps of the defendant which often include low intelligence, lack
of funds, inadequate counsel and no comparable service to match the well
equipped modern crime laboratory. Also, defendant must give notice of
alibi and certain other defenses as well as revealing names of witnesses.
Defendant at a Disadvantage. This -assertion is answered mainly by the
defendant's rights to confrontation of witnesses and privilege against
self-incrimination which go a long way in limiting the use of discovery
devices.
10Id. at 637.
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Liberal discovery rules find ample support in the Canons of
Legal Ethics. This is particularly true in regard to disclosure
of materials by the counsel for prosecution since there is a specific
admonition that the primary duty of a prosecuting attorney is
not to convict but to see that justice is done."' The prosecutor
should embrace the opportunity to divulge to defense counsel any
information which might help to bring all of the evidence before
the court and thus provide a clearer picture of what really hap-
pened.
Of course, all of the discovery devices are subject to certain
limitations and exceptions. For example, one may not discover
the "work product of a lawyer."'12 Both prosecution and defense
are prevented from discovering any information which might be
privileged because of the physician-patient or attorney-client re-
lationship.'3 The government may exercise another privilege in
order to prevent disclosure of military secrets.'4  In addition the
prosecution is restricted in that there are certain constitutional
safeguards which must be observed. The defendant's right to
confrontation of witnesses5 appears at first blush to be a limita-
tion upon the use of depositions, but actually the use of depositions
is quite consistent with the Constitution. 1 The privilege against
self-incrimination 7 limits the use of written interrogatories and
requests for admissions in particular and perhaps impinges to
some extent upon all of the other discovery devices.
STATE COURT PRACTICE
Through the discovery of documents counsel is able to in-
spect and make copies of documents in the hands of opposing
counsel. Although it has often been said that there is no right
11 Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association,
Canon 5.
i2 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1946).
13 Note, 34 Neb. L. Rev. 508 (1955).
'4 United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
15 Neb. Const. Art. I, § 11. "In all criminal prosecutions the accused
shall have the right . . . to meet the witnesses against him face to face
.... ." Also, U. S. Const. Amend. VI. "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses
against him .... ."
16V Wigmore § 1397 (3d. ed. 1940).
i7 Neb. Const. Art. I, § 12. "No person shall be compelled, in any
criminal case, to give evidence against himself .... ." Also, U.S. Const.
Amend. V. "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself .... '2
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of discovery at common law in a criminal case,'8 the Nebraska
courts have recognized a right to discover certain documents with-
out any particular statutory authority. At the present time it
is difficult to ascertain the precise nature of this right since
there is a possibility that it exists independently at common
law' and under the statutes 20 of Nebraska.
The Nebraska court first recognized this right of discovery
in Marshall v. State,21 a forgery prosecution. The court said
there was no abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying
defendant's request to inspect the forged instruments since the
defendant was supplied with photostatic copies of the documents
he sought to inspect. In a murder prosecution in 1944, Cramer
v. State,2 the court ruled there was no abuse of discretion by
the trial court in refusing counsel's request to examine the de-
fendant's confession. Medical experts had been permitted to
read defendant's confession prior to trial and defense counsel
was given a copy of the confession four days before it was offered
in evidence. The court dwelt at some length upon the distinction
between a forged instrument and a confession, evidently indica-
ting that it felt the defendant had a higher right to inspect the
former because the prosecution arose from this specific instru-
ment. In Hameyer v. State,2 a prosecution for obtaining money
by false pretenses, the court compared these previous decisions
and concluded that there was a common law right of discovery in
criminal proceedings which approximated the statutory author-
ity for civil actions. 24  However, the court concluded that under
the circumstances the trial judge had not abused his discretion
in refusing to allow the defendant to inspect and make a copy
of the fake lease which had been used by the defendant in an
effort to obtain the money. The most recent case in point is
Linder v. State,2 5 involving a prosecution for rape. The court
held that there was no error in the trial court's refusal to compel
the county attorney to make available to the defendant before
the trial the results of a medical examination when the defen-
isVI Wigmore § 1859(g) (3d ed. 1940). "Criminal Cases. At common
law no right of inspection of documents before trial was conceded to the
accused; and, of course, the privilege against self-incrimination prevented
any such concession to the prosecution."
19 See notes 21, 22, 23, 25, 26 infra.
20 See note 28 infra.
"1 116 Neb. 45, 215 N.W. 564 (1927).
221145 Neb. 88, 15 N.W.2d 323 (1944).
23 148 Neb. 798, 29 N.W.2d 458 (1947).
24 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1267 (Reissue 1948).
25 156 Neb. 504, 56 N.W.2d 734 (1953).
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dant had been advised of the contents of the report which in-
dicated that the defendant was not mentally ill at the time.
Fisher' v. State,26 although not a case involving pre-trial dis-
closure, is indicative of the court's disposition regarding dis-
covery practice. The defendent was being prosecuted for for-
gery and prior to trial the defendant's attorney secured the check,
which was the basis of the prosecution, from the Telephone Co.
During the course of the trial and over his objection defendant's
attorney was required to produce the check. The supreme court
reversed on the ground that it was error to compel the defendant
or his attorney to hand over such incriminating documents. This
protection against self-incrimination should and does extend to
pre-trial disclosures as well.
Although these decisions are consistent in that all convictions
were affirmed, thereby condoning the trial judge's exercise of
discretion, a distinct difference is to be noted in the general tenor
of the opinions. An analysis based on this "reading between the
lines" might suggest that documents which are the res of the
crimes, i.e., forged notes, fake leases, etc., are probably subject
to inspection by the defendant. On the other hand, certain docu-
ments which may or may not be offered in evidence, such as a
medical report, confession of the defendant, etc., are less likely
to be subject to discovery. If this distinction does exist it seems
undesirable and of course is not in accord with the recent trend
toward more liberal discovery practice. The general policy con-
siderations in this area indicate that all of the items mentioned
above should properly be subject to discovery. 27
A right to discovery of documents in criminal cases may
exist under the statutes of Nebraska independent of the common
law. In 1951, the legislature passed L.B. 136 which to a large
extent embodied the rules relating to discovery found in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure .21 The provisions of L.B. 136
were patterned after federal rule 26 through 37 inclusive-9 and
26 140 Neb. 216, 299 N.W. 501 (1941).
27 These considerations are fully set forth under Rationales and Limi-
tations, supra 645.
28Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1267.01 et seq. (Supp. 1953).
29The legislative history of L.B. 136 demonstrates conclusively that
these sections were taken directly from the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure; however, there is no indication as to whether or not they were
meant to apply to criminal as well as civil cases.
Statement of the Judiciary Committee on L.B. 136, Neb. Legis. 62d
Sess. (1951): "The purpose of this bill is to adopt in Nebraska the pro-
visions of the rules of practice in federal courts with respect to deposi-
tions and discovery. In 1938, the Supreme Court of the United States
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provide for discovery of documents, depositions, written inter-
rogatories, requests for admissions, and physical examinations.
Hence, the following arguments which support the use of the dis-
covery of documents provision of L.B. 136 in criminal cases apply
with equal vigor to all five discovery devices.
Although Nebraska's discovery statutes are found under Title
25, "Civil Procedure," that in itself is by no means conclusive of
an intent to limit their application to civil proceedings, since other
sections found under Title 25 are applicable to criminal as well
as civil cases.3 0 An examination of the enacting clause 1 of L.B.
136 reveals that the bill is "An act relating to procedure in courts
." During this same session several other bills concerning
and the Congress, by their joint action, adopted rules of procedure for
trial of civil cases in United States District Courts. In 1947, amend-
ments thereof were adopted in similar manner. These rules modernize
trial practice and expedite the disposition of litigation. In Nebraska, a
lawyer is now confronted with the necessity of operating under two
different codes of evidence, one in federal courts and a different one in
state courts. In the main, the principles underlying the two systems
are the same. However, there are some differences, and these differ-
ences make it difficult, particularly for a young lawyer, to practice in
both federal and state courts when the rules with respect to evidence
differ. They should be the same. Since it is not possible for the tail
to wag the dog. the Judicial Council has recommended that we adopt the
federal practice in Nebraska."
Hearings before the Judiciary Committee on L.B. 136 and L.B. 406
Neb. Legis. 62d Sess. (1951); "Mr. Robert R. Moodie, of West Point,
chairman of a sub-committee of the Judicial Council, appeared in support
of L.B. 136. He said the bill is practically a verbatim copy of the federal
rules excepting that it eliminates some of the things that do not apply
to state practice.... Hon. James W. Delehant, United States District
Judge, Lincoln Division, speaking in favor of the bills thought they should
be treated without separation, because the measures do interchange and
constitute part of the entire whole. [He] asked that the Committee con-
sider them carefully in connection with the counterparts in Nebraska prac-
tice of Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure dealing with the
subject of pre-trial practice. He dealt with the matters of discovery,
sanctions, interrogatories, depositions, documentary evidence, and ended
by saving that the function of the Legislature is to provide the best
machinery possible for the administration of justice. 'We do not have
an incompetent judicial system. The theory and philosophy of our Code
was approved pretty largely. It is in the way of improvement that we
are before you this afternoon.' "
3ONeb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-1931, 25-1223 et seq., 25-1267.01--25-1267.36
(Reissue 1948).
:lNeb. Laws c. 68, p. 208 (1951).
NOTES
procedure -3 2 were passed and each of these was preceded by an
enacting clause33 which read: "An act relating to procedure in
civil actions ....." The inference from the use of these divergent
clauses is that in the first instance the legislators intended that
the bill relate to procedure in all courts both civil and criminal
and that in the latter instances the operation of the bills was to
be limited to civil actions. If the legislature had intended to
limit the scope of the discovery rules to civil actions, they could
quite easily have done so by using the same unequivocal language
used in other procedure bills passed during the 1951 session.
The conclusion that these discovery devices should apply to both
civil and criminal cases is buttressed by the realization that the
bill did not include any separate provisions relating to discovery
practice in criminal cases.
On the other hand the fact that these rules were adopted
directly from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is an indica-
tion that they were intended to apply only to civil actions. And,
since the predecessor 34 of L.B. 136 had been limited to civil ac-
tions35 perhaps L.B. 136 should likewise be so limited. Legislative
history is of little value in solving this problem since it indicates
merely that the new provisions are patterned after the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.36 There have been no relevant decisions
by the Nebraska supreme court concerning the scope of these
provisions so their possible application in criminal cases remains
an open question with plausible arguments on both sides.
If these provisions are available in criminal proceedings, they
constitute a valuable set of tools for the practicing attorney.
Discovery of Documents.3 7 It would be possible upon a show-
ing of good cause to obtain an order requiring the opposition "to
produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing
. .. of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters,
photographs, objects, or tangible things, not privileged, which
32InclUding, incidentally, L.B. 406 which was considered jointly with
L.B. 136 in the committee hearing. See note 29 supra.
33Neb. Laws c. 65, p. 199; c. 66, p. 201; c. 67, p. 202; c. 70, p. 225
(1951).
34Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-1246 to 1267 (Reissue 1948).
35 See note 23 supra.
36 See note 29 supra.
37Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1267.39 (Supp. 1953). "... any of the matters
within the scope of the examination permitted by section 25-1267.02 .... "
The limiting language of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1267.02 (Supp. 1953)
is quoted in the text.
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constitute or contain evidence . *..."3S Thus under this statutory
authority the scope of discovery would be much broader than at
common law39 and would allow discovery of such documents as
confessions of the defendant and medical reports as well as forged
notes, fake leases, etc. However, statutory discovery is limited
to specific documents which have been clearly identified by the
party seeking to inspect them. Thus counsel is prevented from
engaging in a mere "fishing" expedition or blind effort to gain
access to everything the opposition might have that would be
of value in preparing a case for trial.
Depositions.4 0 The scope of depositions would be limited to
the inspection and copying of any designated documents, books,
photographs, or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute
or contain evidence.4
1
Written Interrogatories.42 A party could serve upon the op-
posing party written interrogatories to be answered by the party
served. When applied to a criminal proceeding, State v. X, De-
fendant, who is to be served with written interrogatories as the
opposing party? It seems likely that if this problem should be
litigated, the courts would rule service upon the prosecuting at-
torney was service upon the opposing party within the meaning
of the statute.4 3  These interrogatories may relate to any matters
concerning the subject matter of the action and may be used in
the same manner as testimony taken by deposition. Note that
there is no provision for court sanctions44 to compel the opposing
party to answer; this provision was omitted by the legislature
when they adopted the federal rules.4 5
Requests for Admissions.40  After the commencement of an
3s Although there are no Nebraska decisions construing these words,
there have been a number of decisions construing their counterpart, Fed.
R. Civ. P. 26(b). See 4 Moore's Federal Practice 1063 (2d ed. 1950).
39 See notes 21. 22, 23, 25, 26 supra.
4ONeb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1267.02 (Supp. 1953).
41 See notes 37, 38 supra.
42 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1267.37 (Supp. 1953).
43 This would be in line with the provisions of the statutes which pro-
claim that service of process upon one of its responsible representatives
constitute valid service upon a corporation. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-507
(Reissue 1948).
44 Fed. R. Civ. P. 33.
45 Although there are no Nebraska decisions concerning this section, there
are a large number of federal cases relating to its counterpart, Fed. R.
Civ. P. 33. See 4 Moore's Federal Practice 2251 (2d ed. 1950).
40 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1267.41 (Supp. 1953).
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action a party could serve upon the opposing party a request for
admissions. Of course, this device is limited by the privilege
against self-incrimination. The opposing party by written reply
must either deny the admissions requested and set forth his reasons
for so doing or submit written objections to the effect that the
requested admissions were privileged or irrelevant. Under a
recent Nebraska decision4 7 the failure to answer a request for
admissions, when ordered by a court to do so, was held an admis-
sion of the facts sought to be elicited.48
Physical Examination.9 In certain cases counsel could gain
a court order compelling a party to submit to a physical examin-
ation. This right is limited to actions in which the mental or
physical condition of a party is an issue, and of course counsel
must show good cause for the issuance of the order.50
An additional right to the use of depositions of non-party
witnesses may exist.51 The statute grants to the defendant the
right to obtain depositions when any of his material witnesses are
about to leave the state, are sick or for some other good reason
would be unable to appear in court. Note that this section ap-
plies only to any "material witness for the defendant," which at
first might seem to preclude its use as a discovery device. How-
ever, a right akin to discovery is available in that if the defen-
dant has good reason to believe that some individual will develop
into a material witness for him, the court may allow the use of
a deposition. Depositions are to be taken in the same manner as
in civil actions5 2 which means that normal direct and cross ex-
amination 3 plus written interrogatories5 4 are available to both
parties as an aid in eliciting information.
Although the statutes relating to criminal procedure do not
specifically so provide, the subpoena duces tecum is available in
criminal cases. Its use as a discovery device is limited in that,
unlike the federal courts, the Nebraska courts are only authorized
to order documents produced at trial; they may not order them
47 Mueller v. Shacklett, 156 Neb. 881, 58 N.W.2d 344 (1953).
4S For federal cases on this section's counterpart, Fed. R. Civ. P. 36,
see 4 Moore's Federal Practice 2701 (2d ed. 1950).
49Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1267.40 (Supp. 1953).
50 For federal cases on this section's counterpart, Fed. R. Civ. P. 35,
see 4 Moore's Federal Practice 2551 (2d ed. 1950).
5'Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1904, (Reissue 1948). Note that this section
appears under Title 29, Criminal Procedure.
52 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1905. (Reissue 1948).
53 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1267.28 (Supp. 1953).
54Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1267.03 (Supp. 1953).
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produced for inspection prior to trial. The section 5 which pro-
vides for writs of subpoena in criminal cases states that they
shall be "served and returned as in other cases . . . ." This refer-
ence to "other cases" leads to the section 56 which provides gen-
erally for the issuance of subpoenas.57 Section 25-1224 provides
for issuance of a subpoena duces tecum ordering a witness to
bring with him "any book, writing or other thing under his con-
trol, which he is bound by law to produce as evidence." Through
the broad language of section 25-1224 (all references are to
"courts" generally not "civil courts") and the necessary implica-
tions in section 29-1905, the subpoena duces tecum has become
available in criminal as well as civil cases.58
Another related right, though not really a matter of dis-
covery since it applies only to determining the nature of the charge,
is the bill of particulars. This right is based upon the Constitu-
tion of the State of Nebraska which provides: "In all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall have the right to... demand the
nature and the cause of accusation and to have a copy thereof
.... ppri Cases construing this provision indicate that its pur-
pose is limited to informing the accused as to the nature of the
offense for which he must answer.60 Note that the defendant
gains notice of certain state witnesses when he is served with an
information; this information must include the names of the
witnesses known to the prosecuting attorney at the time of filing
same.0 1 However, it is not necessary that all witnesses whose
names are endorsed on the information be called ;62 and the trial
55 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1901 (Reissue 1948).
56Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1233 et seq. (Reissue 1948).
57 Although these general provisions are found under Title 25, "Civil
Procedure." in no place is there any indication that their application is
to be limited to civil actions. The language throughout speaks in terms
of "courts" rather than using "civil actions" or some other restrictive
phrase.
5s Recently the Supreme Court of Nebraska recognized, but refused to
pass upon, the question of whether section 25-1233 applies to criminal
cases (the case did not properly raise the issue). Garcia v. State, 159
Neb. 571, 68 N.W.2d 151 (1955).
59Neb. Const. Art. I, § 11. Also see Amendment VI of the United
States Constitution which through Amendment XIV perhaps is applicable
to state courts. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right ... to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation .... .
GOSchluter v. State, 153 Neb. 317, 44 N.W.2d 588 (1950); Kissinger
v. State, 123 Neb. 861, 244 N.W. 794 '(1932); Davis v. State, 118
Neb. 828, 226 N.W. 449 (1929); Moline v. State, 67 Neb. 164, 93 N.W.
228 (1903).
1 leb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1602 (Reissue 1948).
02 Bloom v. State, 95 Neb. 710, 146 N.W. 965 (1914).
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judge, at his discretion may permit additional witnesses to be
endorsed on the information before trial. 63
FEDERAL COURT PRACTICE
Practice in the federal courts is governed by the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Under rule 16 the defendant may
file a motion asking the court to permit him to inspect and copy
any book, paper, document or tangible object obtained from the
defendant or third persons by seizure or process.2 The defen-
dant must specify which documents he wishes to inspect, demon-
strate that the items may be material to his defense, and show
that the request is reasonable. The disposition of such a motion
is left entirely within the discretion of the trial judge.
Under rule 17(c) the trial court may issue a subpoena com-
manding the person to whom it is directed to produce books,
papers, documents, or other objects designated therein25 Such
subpoena may be quashed or modified upon a showing that it
is unreasonable or oppressive. The scope of this rule is limited
in that it extends only to materials which are to be offered in
evidence. This rule is available to both the prosecution and the
defense while the use of rule 16 is limited to the defense counsel.
Rule 15 provides for the use of depositions whenever it ap-
pears that a witness may not be able to attend a trial and his
testimony is material and necessary to prevent a failure of justice.""
Depositions are to be taken in the same manner as in civil cases
7
and may also be taken upon written interrogatories at the re-
quest of the defendant. Depositions are to be used only upon
motion of the defendant; 6S this may have been prompted by ex-
treme caution regarding certain constitutional limitations.," Per-
haps it should be noted that the defendant, when charged with
a capital offense, is also entitled to a list of the prosecution's
witnesses at least three days before trial.70
63 Wilson v. State, 120 Neb. 468, 233 N.W. 461 (1930).
6- Fed. R. Crim. P. 16; see Advisory Committee Notes to rule 16, Bender's
Federal Practice Manual 1149 (1952).
65 Id. 30.
66 Id. 26.
6- See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 et seq.
68 Fed. R. Crim. P. 15(a) " . . . the court at any time after the filing
of an indictment or information may upon motion of a defendant . .. ."
69 U.S. Const. Amend. VI. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against
him....
70 18 U.S.C. § 3432 (1946).
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In the application of these rules a problem has developed
concerning the relative scope of rules 16 and 17(c). Bowman
Dairy v. United States,71 which is the landmark case on this
question, was a prosecution for violation of the Sherman anti-
trust law. The defendant filed a motion pursuant to rule 16 to
obtain certain documents; government attorneys complied. De-
fendant also moved under rule 17(c) for an order directing the
government to produce certain other documents not obtained by
seizure or process.1 2 The order was granted, but Government at-
torneys refused to comply. Upon appeal the Supreme Court held
that under rule 17(c) the trial court had the power to order
the documents produced (except for those under a catchall pro-
vision) .3 Speaking for the Court, Justice Minton said:
There may be documents and other materials in the possession
of the Government not subject to Rule 16. No good reason ap-
pears to us why they may not be reached by subpoena under
Rule 17(c) as long as they are evidentiary. That is not to say
that the materials thus subpoenaed must actually be used in
evidence. It is only required that a good-faith effort be made
to obtain evidence.74
However, Justice Minton continued:
It was not intended by Rule 16 to give a limited right of dis-
covery, and then by Rule 17 to give a right of discovery in
the broadest terms . . . . Rule 17(c) was not intended to pro-
vide an additional means of discovery. Its chief innovation was
71 341 U.S. 214 (1951).
72 The documents were described in the following manner: " 'All docu-
ments, books, papers and objects (except memoranda prepared by Gov-
ernment counsel, and documents or papers solicited by or volunteered to
Government counsel which consist of narrative statements of persons or
memoranda of interviews), obtained by Government counsel. in any man-
ner other than by seizure or process, (a) in the course of the investiga-
tion by Grand Jury No. 8949 which resulted in the return of the indict-
ment herein, and (b) in the course of the Government's preparation for
the trial of this cause, if such books, papers, documents and objects,
(a) have been presented to the Grand Jury; or (b) are to be offered
as evidence on the trial of the defendants, or any of them, under said
Indictment; or (c) are relevant to the allegations or charges contained
in said indictment, whether or not they might constitute evidence with
respect to the guilt, or innocence of any of the defendants.... ".Id.
at 217.
43 This portion of the request referred to books papers, etc. which,
"'(c) are relevant to the allegations or charges contained in said indict-
ment, whether or not they might constitute evidence with respect to the
guilt or innocence of any of the defendants.... .".Id. at 217.
74 341 U.S. 214, 219 (1951).
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to expedite the trial by providing a time and place before trial
for the inspection of the subpoenaed materials. 75
Justice Minton then concluded:
However, the plain words of the Rule are not to be ignored.
They must be given their ordinary meaning to carry out the
purpose of establishing a more liberal policy for the production,
inspection and use of materials at the trial.76
As Judge Bazelon pointed out in Fryer v. United States,7
the Supreme Court appears to have made somewhat conflicting
statements. Since no Supreme Court decision has been handed
down which attempts to rationalize the statements in the Bowman
decision, apparently one of the best ways to analyze the law in
this area is to examine the subsequent decisions of the inferior
federal courts. Fryer v. United States7s seems to stand alone in
seizing upon the liberal language of the Bowman decision. A lower
court conviction was remanded with instructions to reverse if
prejudice was shown, on the ground that discovery should have
been permitted under rule 17(c). More typical of recent de-
cisions79 is Remmer v. United StatessO wherein the court affirmed
a conviction on the ground that the trial judge had not abused
his discretion in denying the defendant discovery under rule 17 (c).
Generally, the decisions seem to indicate that rule 17(c) may
be used by the defendant to discover (1) statements made by
the defendant,81 (2) statements volunteered to the government
by witnesses relating to this cause,s-2 and (3) documents obtained
by the government other than by seizure or process (a) in the
course of the grand jury investigation or (b) in the course of
the government's preparation for trial if the documents were
presented to the grand jury or are to be offered in evidence at
75 Id. at 220.
76 Ibid.
77207 F.2d 134 (D.C. Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 885 (1954).
78 Ibid.
79 United States v. Carter, 15 F.R.D. 367 (D.D.C. 1954); United States
v. Scully, 15 F.R.D. 402 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); United States v. Ward, 120
F. Supp. 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); United States v. Cohen, 15 F.R.D. 269
(S.D.N.Y. 1953); United States v. Mesarosh, 13 F.R.D. 180 (W.D. Pa.
1952); United States v. Schneiderman, 104 F. Supp. 405 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
In the Schneiderman case the court seemed to be motivated by a desire
to protect informants by denying discovery.
SO 205 F.2d 277 (9th Cir. 1953).
SiFryer v. United States, 207 F.2d 134 (D.C. Cir. 1953), cert. denied.
346 U.S. 885 (1954).
82 Ibid.
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the trial of the defendant.8 3 Any request which is broader than
the three outlined above will be denied. Some cases have held
that it was within the discretion of the trial judge to deny in-
spection of documents such as those outlined in (2) or (3) above8s
United States v. Iozia,85 though only a district court de-
cision, is valuable in that it delineates a method of determining
what constitutes a showing of good cause for inspection by the
defendant. The court stated that it was necessary for the de-
fendant to demonstrate:
(1) That the documents are evidentiary and relevant;
(2) That they are not otherwise procurable by the defendant
reasonably in advance of trial by the exercise of due diligence;
(3) That the defendant cannot properly prepare for trial with-
out such production and inspection in advance of trial and the
failure to obtain such inspection may tend unreasonably to delay
the trial;
(4) That the application is made in good faith and is not in-
tended as a general fishing expedition.86
These prerequisites seem to be in keeping with the general tenor
of the Bowman opinion and should provide a sufficient limita-
tion to prevent unreasonably broad attempts at discovery by
counsel who do not have the initiative to prepare their own case
thoroughly. Nor will such a limitation unduly hamper the de-
fendant in preparing his case since discovery is permitted when
he can demonstrate that the prosecution is withholding any speci-
fic information or documents which would be of material aid
in preparing his defense.
Most of the recent cases have applied about the same sort
of test as the court in the lozia decision, two decisions citing it
directly. 7 Rule 17(c) seems to have developed into a weapon
83 Bowman Dairy v. United States, 341 U.S. 214 (1951); United States
v. Iozia, 13 F.R.D. 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). Of course any documents which
are within these broad categories are also subject to discovery when
specifically designated, e.g., forged notes, fake oil leases, confessions of
the defendant or third persons, reports of medical examinations, etc.
84 Some lower courts have refused to allow discovery of documents
named in practically the same manner used by defendant in the Bowman
decision. See note 79 supra.
85 13 F.R.D. 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
sIId. at 338.
N7In United States v. Cohen, 15 F.R.D. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) and
United States v. Scully, 15 F.R.D. 402 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) the court re-
ferred expressly to the test set forth in the Iozia case. For other cases
of similar tenor which do not mention the lozia decision as such, see
note 79 supra.
NOTES
peculiar to the defense (at least insofar as the recent district
court and court of appeals decisions are revelant). On the sole
occasion that a prosecutor sought to invoke rule 17(c) his motion
was promptly dismissed.18 The net result seems to be that so
long as an attorney can demonstrate that the material he seeks
is evidentiary and can identify it with sufficient specificity he
may invoke rule 17(c) as a supplement to rule 16, thus reaching
documents whether or not they were secured by the government
through seizure or process.8 9
CONCLUSION
In the state courts of Nebraska a right to discover certain
documents is recognized at common law; however, the supreme
court has yet to reverse a lower court conviction on the ground
that discovery was improperly denied by the trial court. It is
possible that L.B. 136 may have conferred certain rights of dis-
covery in criminal as well as civil actions, although the argu-
ments offered in support of such a proposition are by no means
conclusive. If L.B. 136 does apply to criminal cases the follow-
ing devices are available: discovery of documents (more liberal
than at common law), depositions, written interrogatories, re-
quests for admissions and physical examinations. The obvious
conclusion is that discovery devices in the state courts of Ne-
braska are quite limited.
In the federal courts a more liberal discovery practice pre-
vails. The defendant has the right to inspect any documents or
tangible objects obtained from him or third persons by seizure
or process. In addition either party will probably be able to
inspect documents, objects, etc. which are in the hands of op-
posing counsel so long as the objects have been identified suf-
ficiently and they are evidentiary in nature. In certain situa-
tions counsel will be able to use depositions and secure lists of
the witnesses of the opposition.
Justice is served through the liberalization of discovery prac-
tice, and although it is conceivable that there are a number of
discovery devices available in a criminal case in Nebraska, their
existence and scope is far from certain at the present time. It
would be desirable if some comprehensive system similar to that
adopted for civil cases 0 could find approval in our legislature.
s8 United States v. O'Conner, 118 F. Supp. 248 (D.Mass. 1953).
s9 See Comment, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 493 (1954). A good discussion of
the various discovery devices available in federal courts.
9ONeb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1267.01 et seq. (Supp. 1953).

